Bank Capital Shocks and Portfolio Risk: Evidence from Japan by Iwatsubo, Kentaro
Hitotsubashi University Repository
Title








RightCenter for Economic Institutions 









Bank Capital Shocks and Portfolio Risk: 



















Center for Economic 
Institutions 
 
Working Paper Series 
 
Institute of Economic Research 
Hitotsubashi University 
2-1 Naka, Kunitachi, Tokyo, 186-8603    JAPAN 
Tel:  +81-42-580-8405 
Fax:  +81-42-580-8333 






Despite the downward trend of land prices and the ex-post low re-
turn on real estate loans, Japanese banks increased their lending to the
real estate sector during the 1990s. We argue that this phenomenon
can be explained by the risk-shifting incentives of banks and discover
that banks with low capital-to-asset ratios and low franchise value
chose high-risk assets such as real estate loans. Unlike previous stud-
ies, we show that the capital-risk relationship is nonlinear and changes
from positive to negative as franchise value falls. We also ￿nd that a
capital adequacy requirement did not prevent risk-taking behavior of
undercapitalized banks since they then just issued more subordinated
debts to meet this requirement. In contrast, government capital injec-
tions led banks to reduce risky loans at the margin. Recapitalization
by issuing subordinated debts helped banks recover their capital losses
and mitigated the credit crunch, but consequently allowed them to in-
crease their exposure to the real estate sector and worsened the bad
loan problems.
￿JEL classi￿cation: G21, C33. Keywords: Bank risk, Risk-shifting incentives, Fran-
chise value, Capital adequacy requirement.
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11 Introduction
It is well known that excessive bank lending to the real estate sector was
one of the main causes of the Japanese land market boom in the late 1980s.
While land prices declined steadily in the 1990s, surprisingly, Japanese banks
increased their lending to the real estate sector until 1998. During the same
period, total loans outstanding leveled o⁄ and loans to some industries,
such as manufacturing, declined substantially. Why did banks shift their
loan portfolio toward the real estate sector despite the ex-post low return
on real estate loans?
The banking literature has long examined risk-taking behavior of banks
and most observers agree that moral hazard plays an important role. They
describe the problem of "gambling for resurrection": poorly capitalized
banks choose a risky asset portfolio at the cost of the deposit insurance
system. This risk-shifting incentive, together with the contagion e⁄ects of
bank failures, has been the main justi￿cation of a capital adequacy require-
ment. However, the relationship between bank capital and risk under a
capital adequacy requirement remains, to date, inconclusive. In the theory
literature, Koehn and Santomero (1980) and Kim and Santomero (1988),
using a mean-variance framework, show that increased regulatory capital
standards may lead banks to choose risky portfolios to cover the loss in util-
ity from the decrease in leverage. Conversely, Furlong and Keeley (1989)
and Keeley and Furlong (1990) argue, using a contingent-claim model, that
an increase in capital reduces the value of the deposit insurance put option,
thereby reducing the incentive of banks to increase portfolio risk. The em-
pirical evidence on the e⁄ectiveness of capital adequacy requirements is also
mixed.1
The purpose of this paper is two-fold. At the theory level, we argue that
the relationship between capital and risk is nonlinear and varies with respect
to franchise value.2 At the empirical level, we convincingly document the
1A number of empirical studies have been undertaken in the U.S. Haubrich and Wachtel
(1993) suggest that implementation of the Basel risk-based capital standards caused poorly
capitalized banks to recon￿gure their portfolios away from high-risk assets toward low-
risk assets. In contrast, Hancock and Wilcox (1994) ￿nd that banks which had less
capital than required by the risk-based standards shifted their portfolios toward high-
risk assets. Shrieves and Dahl (1992) use a simultaneous equation model and ￿nd a
positive relationship between changes in capital and risk between 1983-1987. Using the
same simultaneous equation model, however, Jacques and Nigro (1997) ￿nd a negative
relation between the two variables during 1990-1991.
2The franchise value is de￿ned as the present discounted value of the future stream of
rents that banks will be able to obtain (Keeley, 1990).
2existence of such a relationship and show that banks with low capital-to-
asset ratios and low franchise value increased their issuing of real estate
loans. We also examine the e⁄ects of a capital adequacy requirement and
government capital injections on the risk-taking behavior of banks.
In the two-period model we present, bank risk is determined by the trade-
o⁄ between a deposit insurance subsidy and future rent or franchise value.
An exogenous decline in capital lowers the franchise value, but whether this
leads banks to increase or decrease the risk pro￿le of their loans depends on
the initial franchise value. If it is su¢ ciently high, the optimal choice is to
lower the amount of risky loans to prevent insolvency, while the riskiness of
loans increases if the franchise value is su¢ ciently low.
In the same framework, we then analyze whether a capital adequacy
requirement and capital injections by the government reduce the amount of
risk banks take on. We show that a prospective capital requirement leads
banks to increase current risk because capital is more expensive in the future
binding period so that banks have an incentive to take on risk to increase
capital in the current period. Conversely, prospective capital injections by
the government allow banks to increase franchise value, and hence, reduce
risk in the current period. Our model clearly demonstrates the forward-
looking features of banks￿risk-taking behavior which had been overlooked
in the banking literature until recently.
The empirical controversy is partly due to the di¢ culty of ￿nding appro-
priate measures of bank risk and the regulatory pressure on bank capital.
We propose using the real estate loan ratio as a new proxy for the portfolio
risk of Japanese banks in the 1990s. The bursting of a real estate market
bubble in the early 1990s increased the uncertainty about the expected re-
turns to the real estate investments. We also suggest using the subordinated
debt ratio as a proxy for regulatory pressure in the form of a bank capital
requirement since Japanese banks with low capital issued more subordinated
debts to meet the requirement.3 Due to the fact that banks usually avoid
operating at the maximum leverage allowed, researchers have used ad-hoc
measures for the impact of a capital adequacy requirement. Our proxy en-
ables us to identify the extent of regulatory pressure independent of the
3A growing number of observers have proposed to use subordinated debt to increase
market discipline on banks, which could mitigate moral hazard. Subordinated debt is
junior to all claims other than equity, and thus, may deter risk-taking because a bank￿ s
expected cost of issuing subordinated debt increases with an increase in the bank￿ s risk
portfolio. However, recently Levonian (2001) and Blum (2002) show the ambiguous e⁄ect
of subordinated debt on risk-taking. The empirical e⁄ect of subordinated debt serving as
market discipline remains inconclusive.
3capital level.
Moreover, simultaneous determination of bank capital and risk compli-
cates e⁄orts to isolate the e⁄ect of banks￿capital on their risk decisions. The
potential problem of endogeneity of bank capital is further complicated by
serial correlation of risk. To deal with this, we estimate the dynamic panel
model with a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator based on
Arellano and Bond (1991).
Panel data from Japanese banks support our theory. We show evidence
that banks with low capital and low franchise value choose high-risk as-
sets and that the slope of risk with respect to capital is negative when the
franchise value is low, but becomes positive when franchise value increases
su¢ ciently. This latter observation suggests that banks￿franchise value is
germane to determining their responses to capital changes. Regarding the
e⁄ectiveness of regulatory measures, we ￿nd that capital-constrained banks
took greater risks. Since it was less di¢ cult for these undercapitalized banks
to recapitalize by issuing subordinated debts, they did this to meet the cap-
ital requirement without a substantial reduction of their assets. However,
issuing subordinated debts allowed them to lend more to the real estate
sector. In contrast, government capital injections led banks to reduce risky
loans at the margin.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
risk and capital positions of Japanese banks in the 1990s, with an emphasis
on our measures for bank portfolio risk and regulatory pressure on bank
capital. Section 3 illustrates the model used to derive testable hypotheses,




Figure 1 displays the total loans outstanding and real estate loans outstand-
ing held by all Japanese banks for 1980 to 2000. From 1980 to 1990, both
total loans and real estate loans increased substantially. While total loans
leveled o⁄ in the 1990s, real estate loans continued to increase until 1998.
Figure 2 reveals that banks shifted their loan portfolios towards the real
estate sector in the 1990s. The share of real estate loans in total loans
steadily increased until 1998, while that of manufacturing loans declined
substantially. The increase in real estate lending is particularly puzzling,
given the downward trend in land prices. As shown in Figure 3, the land
4price index reached a peak in 1991, one year following the peak in stock
prices, and then fell continuously until the early 2000s.
In Japan, many bank failures resulted from excessive real estate lending.
For example, Nippon Credit bank, for which real estate loans comprised up
to 25 percent of total loans, failed in 1998. When two regional banks, Kyoto
Kyoei Bank and Naniwa Bank were merged with other banks in 1998, about
30 percent of the total loans held by each bank were real estate loans.
The role real estate loans have played in causing non-performing loan
problems in Japan has been widely discussed. Ueda (2000) presents the high
correlation between the non-performing loan ratio of 147 banks in 1996 and
their share of loans to real estate related industries (real estate, construction,
and non-bank ￿nancial institutions) in 1990. Hoshi (2001) ￿nds that banks
which shifted their loan portfolio more towards the real estate sector between
1983 and 1990 had accumulated larger amounts of non-performing loans by
1998.
Table 1 shows an average of the proportion of non-performing loans by
industry for four major city banks in Japan between March 1999 and March
2002 (end of ￿scal year). The decomposition of non-performing loans by
industry is not available for many banks, as only a few banks had started to
disclose such information in their ￿nancial reports as of March 1999. The
real estate industry has the largest concentration of non-performing loans
among the seven industrial categories in the table, climbing to roughly 30-
35 percent. In contrast, the proportion of non-performing loans from the
manufacturing sector is low between 1999 and 2002. Given that real estate
loans comprise a lower share of total loans outstanding than manufacturing
loans, the real estate loans can be regarded as relatively risky.
In order to be able to take advantage of real estate loan issuance as a
proxy for the portfolio risk of banks, we also need to show that their ex-ante
risk is high. Indeed, many articles document that investment in the real
estate sector, especially commercial real estate development such as o¢ ce
building, retail centers, and industrial facilities, has traditionally been quite
risky (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 1997). The riskiness of real
estate projects has a number of reasons.
Firstly, real estate construction projects typically have a long gestation
period. When completed projects ￿nally come to market, demand condi-
tions may have changed considerably from what they were at the time of
conception.
Another cause of risk is that commercial real estate projects tend to be
highly leveraged. Real estate developers usually operate with a minimum of
capital in order to shift as much of the risk as possible to the lender. Banks
5generally try to protect themselves by requiring low loan-to-value ratios,
guarantees, takeout commitments for longer-term ￿nancing, and strict loan
covenants that will protect them against risky behavior by the developer
after the loan is made. But when real estate markets become overheated,
underwriting standards often deteriorate.
Boom and bust cycles in the real estate market and banking crises are
correlated in a remarkable number of instances in both advanced industrial
countries and emerging economies. Norway, Finland and Sweden had sim-
ilar experiences to Japan in the 1980s and early 1990s. Among emerging
economies ￿nancial crises of this type have been prevalent since 1980. Ex-
amples include Argentina, Chile and most recently the South East Asian
countries of Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and South Korea.
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) study a wide range of crises in 20 coun-
tries, including 5 developed countries and 15 emerging ones. A common
precursor to most crises considered was ￿nancial liberalization and signi￿-
cant credit expansion. These are followed by a substantial rise in the prices
of real estate assets and stocks. At some point the bubble bursts and the
real estate and stock markets collapse. In many cases, banks and other in-
termediaries are overexposed to the real estate and equity markets followed
by a banking crisis typically a year later.
Although the episodes share the same progression, they also exhibit dif-
ferences. The most noticeable di⁄erence between Japan and other crisis
countries is that Japan su⁄ered a banking crisis seven to eight years after
the collapse of asset market bubble, a much longer lag than average (Herring
and Wachter, 1999). During that period, banks increased their exposure to
the real estate sector. It is not certain whether they expected the real es-
tate price decline not to last and land prices to rebound quickly, but in
any case the changes in the market indeed increased uncertainty about the
expected returns to real estate investments. Japanese banks should have
recognized that real estate loans were risky based on the banking crises in
other countries.
2.2 Bank Capital
The stagnation of asset prices and increased non-performing loans in the
1990s undermined the capital base of the banking industry in Japan. The
capital loss occurred at the same time that banks came under increased
regulatory pressure. Internationally active banks in Japan were required to
achieve the 8 percent capital requirement by March 1993, the end of their
￿scal year.
6One distinctive feature for Japanese banks is that they own stocks of both
￿nancial and non-￿nancial companies as a part of long-term relationships.
Since banks obtained these stocks a long time ago, unrealized capital gains
were hidden from the balance sheet in accordance with Japanese accounting
standards. Re￿ ecting this fact, 45 percent of unrealized capital gains from
long-term holdings are allowed to be counted as tier 2 capital, since they are
not intended to be traded for pro￿ts. However, as Japanese stock prices fell
sharply after the market￿ s peak in December 1989, banks￿hidden reserves
shrank substantially. In addition, the decline in stock prices made it di¢ cult
for banks to issue new equities with attractive terms. Ultimately, banks with
low capital ratios were forced to issue subordinated debts and/or reduce
lending to meet the capital adequacy requirement.
Figure 4 shows the average capital-to-asset ratio for 35 private banks
between 1990 and 2000 which were subject to the 8 percent BIS capital
adequacy requirement as of March 1999. The sample includes 9 city banks,
2 long-term credit banks, 6 trust banks and 18 regional banks, representing
about 60 percent of total Japanese bank assets in 1999.4 The choice of these
banks is based on the fact that domestically active banks and internationally
active banks seem to have di⁄erent targets for their capital-to-asset ratio.
The capital-to-asset ratio declined until 1992, but increased to 11.5 percent
in 2000. The rise in 1999 and 2000 is due to capital injections provided by
the government in 1998 and 1999. In response to the signi￿cant shortfalls
of capital of many banks, the government consequently injected 1.8 million
yen (0.4 percent of GDP) in March 1998 and 7.5 million yen (1.6 percent of
GDP) in March 1999 into these banks in the form of preferred shares and
subordinated debts.5
Figure 4 also displays four components of the capital-to-asset ratio. The
equity capital ratio had been stable until 1998, while the hidden capital gains
declined markedly due to fallo⁄s in stock prices. A substantial reduction in
the capital-to-asset ratio was o⁄set mainly by issuing subordinated debts.
As of 1990, the Ministry of Finance has allowed banks to issue subordi-
nated debt in order to help them raise their capital ratios. BIS rules permit
up to 50 percent of non-perpetual subordinated debt with a maturity of
4The sample includes those regional banks which do not have international operations
but which elected to be subject to the 8 percent BIS capital adequacy requirement.
5To qualify for the capital injection, banks were required to submit a restructuring
plan (including the raising of new capital from the private sector) which would be subject
to review on a quarterly basis. If the progress in the restructuring of a bank was not
satisfactory, its holdings of preferred stocks would be converted to common stocks after a
certain grace period, a policy intended to put pressure on management.
7longer than ￿ve years to be counted as tier 2 capital. Furthermore, 100 per-
cent of perpetual subordinated debt with a maturity of longer than ￿ve years
is also allowed to be counted as tier 2 capital. Subordinated debt played an
important role in the process of recapitalization of Japanese banks. With-
out issuing subordinated debts, the capital-to-asset ratio of the major banks
would have declined below 8 percent.
We will examine what has driven banks￿decisions to issue subordinated
debt. Horiuchi and Shimizu (1998) and Ito and Sasaki (1998) ￿nd that banks
with low capital reserves issued more subordinated debts. However, they do
not take into account the censored character of the subordinated debt data
(Horiuchi and Shimizu) or individual heterogeneity (Ito and Sasaki). We
estimate a Tobit model with random e⁄ects. The equation estimated is
Yi;t = ￿ + ￿1equityi;t￿1 + ￿2hiddeni;t￿1 + ￿3provisioni;t￿1
+
P2000
j=1991 ￿j j_dumt + "i;t
where "i;t = ￿i + !i;t; ￿i s N(0;￿2
￿); !i;t s N(0;￿2
!)
subi;t = Yi;t if Yi;t > 0;
= 0 if Yi;t ￿ 0;
and j_dumt = 1 if j = t;
= 0 if j 6= t:
The latent variable (Y ) in the index function equals the ratio of subor-
dinated debts to total risk-adjusted assets (sub), if it takes a non-negative
value. The independent variables in the function are bank equity capi-
tal (equity), hidden capital gains (hidden) and provisions for loan losses
(provision), each as a proportion of total risk-adjusted assets. To mitigate
the potential simultaneity problem, all independent variables, except for
year dummies, are taken at time t￿1. Year dummies (j_dum) are included
to control for time trends. The sample period is between 1990 and 2000.
Table 2 shows the results of the Tobit model and the random-e⁄ects
Tobit model. The results are consistent with previous studies, suggesting
that banks with lower equity capital, lower hidden capital gains, and lower
provisions for loan losses issued more subordinated debt. Since banks were
allowed to issue subordinated debt in 1990, they have compensated for the
shortfalls of equity capital and hidden capital gains by issuing subordinated
debt to meet the capital adequacy requirement. Although the capital re-
quirement was seemingly unbinding for all banks, it was a severe hurdle
especially for undercapitalized banks. Since it was di¢ cult to quickly recap-
italize in the face of large amounts of non-performing loans and a stagnant
8stock market, subordinated debt was the only instrument to help undercap-
italized banks sustain their capital bases at relatively high levels. In light
of this, we use the subordinated debt ratio as a proxy for the regulatory
pressure of a capital adequacy requirement in section 4.
3 Theory
To develop testable hypotheses, we present a model to analyze the e⁄ects of
three types of shocks to bank capital on risk-taking. These are: (1) a decline
in asset values, (2) application of the Basel Accords on Capital Standards
and (3) capital injections by the government. Our two-period model allows
for three types of bank capital shocks to have di⁄erent impacts on bank risk;
for example, tightening the capital adequacy requirement does not have the
same e⁄ect as government capital injections.
This model builds on Blum (1999). While Blum (1999) focuses on the
e⁄ects of a capital requirement on risk, our model aims at analyzing the
e⁄ects of a capital decline on risk decisions and the e⁄ectiveness of policy
measures including capital injections by the government.
In this model, bank risk is determined by the trade-o⁄between a deposit
insurance subsidy and future rent or franchise value.6 While a bank￿ s risk-
taking increases pro￿ts when successful, it also increases the probability of
bank failure and, thereby, increases the probability of losing franchise value
which shareholders would otherwise enjoy.
Consider the following two-period model. At time t = 0, a bank invests
all of its assets and at time t = 1 returns are realized. If the bank does
not default, another investment can be undertaken. After one period the
￿nal returns are realized at t = 2. We assume that bank managers are risk
neutral and maximize the expected value of their equity at t = 2 in the
interest of shareholders.
The bank is ￿nanced by equity and deposits. While the initial stock
of equity is exogenously given, the bank chooses deposits D0 at t = 0:
After one period, the bank has to pay the cost of deposits C(D0) with
C0;C00 > 0 and C(0) = 0. This cost function results from an imperfect
6The model extends the argument of Merton (1977), Marcus (1984) and Keeley (1990).
Merton (1977) shows that deposit insurance can be viewed as a put option on the value of
the bank￿ s asset. If the insurance premium is risk-insensitive, the bank can increase the
value of the put option by increasing the risk of its asset and/or decreasing its capital-to-
assets ratio. This moral hazard hypothesis is re￿ned by Marcus (1984) and Keeley (1990),
who consider that banks have an incentive to take on risk when the bank franchise value
falls su¢ ciently.
9competition framework under which horizontally di⁄erentiated banks enjoy
a local monopoly. If they want to attract more deposits, they have to raise
interest rates to increase their market share.
We assume that all depositors are protected by full deposit insurance.
Since depositors are perfectly insured, depositors can get their money back
no matter how riskily the bank behaves. Therefore the demand for deposits
is independent of the bank￿ s riskiness.7
At t = 0 the bank has two investment opportunities: a safe asset with
gross rate of return Rf ￿ 1 and a risky portfolio. We assume the following
two point distribution of the gross rate of return e R on the risky portfolio.
e R = X with probability p(X)
= 0 with probability 1 ￿ p(X)
for X > Rf; with p(Rf) = 1: We assume that p0(X) < 0; that is, the high
rate of return is associated with a low probability of success. Together with
p00(X) 6 0; these assumptions imply that the expected return E[e RjX] =
p(X)X is strictly concave in X. In a certain range the expected return
is positively correlated with the level of risk X, while after some point a
further increase in risk leads to a decrease in expected returns. This return
structure is similar to that of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and allows us to
avoid corner solutions with in￿nite risk. In order for the expected return to
be increasing in X at Rf; we also assume that p0(X) > ￿1=Rf: Hence, the
safe asset is weakly dominated by the risky portfolio. Since all the funds
are invested in the risky portfolio, the probability of default is 1 ￿ p(X) for
every given X: The level of risk X is chosen by the bank at t = 0.
If the available funds at t = 1 are not su¢ cient to cover the costs C(D0),
the bank will default and all the remaining funds are transferred to the
deposit insurance funds which also pays depositors their contracted returns.
Due to limited liability, bank owners are not forced to pay any additional
amount to cover unful￿lled claims.
In period 2, the model has the same structure as period 1. While the
costs of deposits D1 are C(D1) (with C0;C00 > 0; C(0) = 0), the amount
of bank equity W1 is determined by the initial amount W0 plus the pro￿ts
or losses of period 1. To simplify the model structure, we abstract from
7In Japan, all banks are obliged to join the deposit insurance system which was in-
troduced in 1971. Japanese deposit insurance covers up to 10 million yen of deposits.
The insurance premium imposed on banks is 0.024 percent of the outstanding amount of
eligible deposits. Hence, the premium is unrelated to the degree of risk that banks are
actually exposed to.
10uncertainty in period 2 and replace the random variable in the second period
with its expected value R > Rf:
3.1 Capital Declines and Risk
First we consider the impact of a decline in bank capital on risk-taking




where W1 = X(W0 + D0) ￿ C(D0) is the value of equity at t = 1 in case of
success. Due to limited liability, the value of equity in case of failure is zero
and the bank cannot continue operation. Therefore, the second term is zero.
Rewriting this, we get
max p(X)f[X(W0 + D0) ￿ C(D0) + D1]R ￿ C(D1)g:
The ￿rst order conditions are
p
0
( b X)[(c W1 + b D1)R ￿ C( b D1)] + p( b X)R(W0 + b D0) = 0 (1)
where c W1 = b X(W0 + b D0) ￿ C( b D0)
b X = C0( b D0) (2)
R = C0( b D1) (3)
We will denote the values of X;D0;D1 which satisfy these conditions by
b X; b D0; b D1:
The ￿rst term in Eq.(1) represents the marginal cost of increasing risk
and the second term is the marginal return on risk. The expression in
brackets is the pro￿t of the bank in case of success. Increasing risk slightly
lowers the probability of success by p0(X), and therefore lowers the expected
pro￿ts. The second term is the marginal return on risk. A higher risk is
associated with a higher return on the total amount of funds invested in the
risky asset at t = 0, W0+ b D0: This higher return in the case of success in turn
translates into a higher amount of equity at t = 1, which can be invested
in the risky asset with return R: Therefore, an increase in risk by one unit
increases the pro￿ts, as long as the bank does not default, by R(W0 + b D0).
At the optimal level of risk, marginal cost equals marginal return.
11Now, we want to determine the impact of a decline in bank capital on
risk-taking. In order to do this, we totally di⁄erentiate Eqs. (1), (2), (3)




(p0( b X) b X + p( b X))R
p00( b X)fR(c W1 + b D1) ￿ C( b D1)g + 2p0( b X)(W0 + b D0)R
: (4)
Inserting Eq.(1) into the numerator of the Eq.(4), we get
d b X
dW0
= ￿[p0( b X)fC( b D0)R ￿ ( b D1R ￿ C( b D1))g]
= [p00( b X)fR(c W1 + b D1) ￿ C( b D1)g(W0 + b D0) + 2p0( b X)R(W0 + b D0)2]:
While the denominator is clearly negative, the sign of the numerator is
not obviously determined.
If the expected pro￿t obtained by issuing deposits in period 2, b D1R ￿
C( b D1), is high enough to exceed C( b D0)R; the numerator becomes negative.
This suggests that the bank lowers the risk of its loan portfolio when it loses
bank capital at t = 0. Conversely, if the expected pro￿t obtained by issuing
deposits in period 2 is lower than C( b D0)R, the bank increases its risk in
response to a decline in its capital. The reason is that in case of failure,
the bank not only has a payo⁄ of zero in period 1 but also loses pro￿ts in
period 2. If the future pro￿ts are su¢ ciently high, it is optimal for the bank
to reduce risk to increase the probability of getting these rents. In contrast,
the bank has an incentive to increase risk if the future pro￿ts are low.
Proposition 1 Under the ￿at-rate deposit insurance system, an exogenous
decline in capital leads a bank to increase the riskiness of its loan portfolio
if its franchise value is su¢ ciently low. Conversely, if the franchise value is
su¢ ciently high the bank will lower its chosen risk level.
3.2 Policy Shocks to Bank Capital
We then consider two kinds of policy shocks to bank capital: applying the
Basel Accord on Capital Standards and capital injections by the government.
To ￿gure out whether bank risk can be hindered by prospective prudential
policies, we assume that these policies are implemented at t = 1. This
implies that the bank decides the level of risk at t = 0 anticipating that it
would be constrained in capital or recapitalized by the government at t = 1.8
8The following facts are consistent with this assumption. The BIS capital adequacy re-
quirement was fully e⁄ective in 1993, but the schedule had been known in 1988. Similarly,
123.2.1 Capital Adequacy Requirements
We ￿rst examine how the level of risk changes today if a bank faces a binding
capital constraint in a future period. According to the Basel Accord of 1988,
the value of bank capital has to be at least as high as a given fraction of all
risk-weighted assets.9 In this model a capital-asset ratio c in period 2 implies
that a bank can invest no more than W1=c ￿ kW1 in the risky portfolio.10 If
the capital adequacy requirement is binding, as much as possible is invested
in the risky asset, kW1. For this, (k ￿1)W1 deposits are necessary. Beyond
that, the bank can issue further deposits D1, as long as these funds are
invested in the safe asset. The total amount of deposits is therefore
D1 = max f(k ￿ 1)W1;C0￿1(Rf)g
or
D1 = (k ￿ 1)W1 + D1:
The problem the bank has to solve is
max
X;D0;D1
p(X)fkW1R + D1Rf ￿ C(D1)g; D1 ￿ 0
where W1 = (W0 + D0)X ￿ C(D0) is the value of capital in the case of
success.














1) ￿ 0; D
r
1[Rf ￿ C0(Dr
1)] = 0; D
r
1 ￿ 0: (7)





To analyze the e⁄ect of the capital requirement on the risk-taking behav-
ior of a bank, we totally di⁄erentiate Eq. (5) and (6) and apply the implicit
it was widely believed that government did not allow banks to fail until the banking crisis
in the late 1990s. Thus, capital injections by the government were not startling when they
took place in 1998.
9Dewatripont and Tirole (1995) o⁄er a detailed explanation of the Basel Accord on
Capital Standards.
10It should be noted that, in contrast to most models in the literature, the capital
requirements are not necessarily binding in reality. Milne (2002) and Gan (2001) consider
this puzzle.












1)g + 2p0(Xr)(W0 + Dr
0) (8)
fkR ￿ (k ￿ 1)C0(Dr
1)g ￿ p(Xr)H2]
where H1 = (k ￿ 1)Wr
1C00(Dr
1) if D1 = 0;
= 0 if D1 > 0:
H2 = (k ￿ 1)2(W0 + Dr
0)2C00(Dr
1) if D1 = 0;
= 0 if D1 > 0:
As before, the denominator of Eq.(8) is negative, while the numerator is
not obviously of a given sign. Hence, the level of risk may either increase
or decrease if the capital requirement is tightened. However, at the point
where the capital requirement becomes just binding, we know from Eq.(3)
that R = C0(Dr
1). At that point the numerator is p(Xr)(W0+Dr
0)H1, which
must be positive. Hence, the risk unambiguously increases if the requirement
is tightened (k decreases and c increases).
The key insight can be obtained from Eq. (5). As before, the ￿rst term
represents the marginal cost of increasing risk and the second term the mar-
ginal return on risk. Under a binding capital constraint, the pro￿ts in case
of success become lower; hence, the marginal cost of taking risk is lowered.
On the other hand, a binding regulation increases the marginal return of
taking risk because the marginal value of equity is higher than in the ab-
sence of any regulations. Without capital constraints, an additional unit of
equity at t = 1 is invested in the risky asset and generates an additional
return of R. If a bank faces the binding constraint, an additional unit of
equity allows the bank to invest k units in the risky asset and generates a
return of kR: Since k > 1, the bank has to increases the supply of deposits
by (k￿1) to ￿nance the di⁄erence between the possible investment of size k





1) if the requirement is binding, the marginal value of equity at
t = 1 is higher than in the absence of a capital requirement.
kR ￿ (k ￿ 1)C0(Dr
1) ￿ R:
Hence, under binding capital constraints, an additional unit of equity is
more valuable for a bank. If raising equity is excessively costly, the only way
to increase equity in period 2 is to increase risk in period 1.
14As the requirement is further tightened, risk increases further. Ulti-
mately, the sign of the numerator changes and the risk decreases.11 How-
ever, the risk cannot be lowered below the unconstrained level of risk, b X.
To understand this, we consider the case of tightest regulation, k = 1;











] = 0: (9)
Rewriting Eq.(1), we get
p0( b X) b X + p( b X) ￿ p0( b X)[
C( b D0)
b D0 + W0
￿
b D1R ￿ C( b D1)
R( b D0 + W0)
] = 0: (10)
Comparing Eq.(9) and (10), it is clear that Xr > b X since Dr
1Rf ￿
C(Dr
1) < b D1R￿C( b D1). It should be noted that even if a bank only expects
a future capital requirement to increase, this may lead to an adverse e⁄ect on
its choice of risk today. In this case, the prospective prudential regulation,
aimed at making the banking industry safer in the future, will actually make
it more risky in the current period.12
Proposition 2 If a bank faces a binding capital adequacy requirement in
the future, the level of risk today is higher than in the absence of a capital
requirement.
3.2.2 Government Capital Injections
This section considers the e⁄ect of a capital injection by the government on
risk-taking behavior. We assume that the government recapitalizes a bank
with K (> 0) at t = 1.
The recapitalized bank￿ s problem is
max
X;D0;D1
p(X)f(W1 + D1 + K)R ￿ C(D1)g
where W1 = X(W0 + D0) ￿ C(D0) is the value of equity at t = 1:





1 + K)R ￿ C(Dc
1)] + p(Xc)R(W0 + Dc
0) = 0 (11)
11Using Eq. (9), it is straightforward to show that the denominator of Eq. (8) is positive
at k = 1.
12As Blum (1999) discusses, if a bank faces a binding constraint in the ￿rst period, it
decreases its risk.
15where Wc











Compared with an unregulated bank, the pro￿t of a recapitalized bank
in case of success increases by K, which increases the marginal cost of taking
risk. By contrast, the marginal return on risk remains unchanged. There-
fore, the optimal level of risk decreases as the size of the capital injection
increases. To solve for the e⁄ect of a capital injection by the government,
we again totally di⁄erentiate Eqs. (11), (12), (13) and apply the implicit
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The sign is obviously negative, meaning that the chosen level of risk is
lower than in the absence of any regulation and recapitalization. The capital
injection by the government at t = 1 increases the banks￿franchise value,
which prevents the bank from taking risk at t = 0.13
Proposition 3 Prospective government capital injections reduce a bank￿ s
risk today.
4 Empirical Results
This section tests the implications of the hypotheses developed in the last
section with panel data from 35 major banks that are subject to the 8
percent international capital requirement. We use the real estate loan ratio
as a proxy for the portfolio risk of Japanese banks in the 1990s.
4.1 E⁄ect of Capital on Risk
First we examine whether weakly capitalized banks take greater risks if they
have low franchise values and whether they choose lower risk if they have
13If the government injects capital in the ￿rst period, then whether banks increase or
decrease the risk depends on the franchise value.
16high franchise values (Proposition 1). We estimate the following regression
equation:
riski;t = ￿1+￿1riski;t￿1+￿2capi;t+￿3frani;t+￿4capi;t￿frani;t+BZt+"i;t
"i;t = ￿i + ￿i;t:
The dependent variable (risk) is real estate loans as a share of total
loans outstanding. The independent variables include the lagged real estate
ratio (risk￿1), the ratio of capital to risk-adjusted assets (cap) and franchise
value (fran). Following Keeley (1990), we use Tobin￿ s average q, de￿ned as
the ratio of total market value to book value of equity capital, as a proxy
for franchise value. The interaction term between the capital-to-asset ratio
and the franchise value is also included to allow us to analyze the capital
sensitivity of risk when franchise value changes.
Z is a vector of macroeconomic factors common to the decisions of all
banks. In Z, we include the industrial production index (indpro), the stock
price index (stock), the interbank money market rate (call) and the spread
between the lending and deposit rates (spread). The industrial production
index and the stock price index capture their in￿ uence on the distribution
function for the rate of return on loans. The call rate and the spread between
lending and deposit rates are included because the call rate is regarded as re-
￿ ecting the opportunity cost of credit supply and the spread as representing
the pro￿tability of banks.
To take into account the endogeneity of capital and the serial correlation
of risk, we estimate the dynamic panel model with a GMM estimator (Arel-
lano and Bond, 1991). This is accomplished by using speci￿ed lags for both
dependent and independent variables as instruments. We eliminate ￿xed-
e⁄ects by ￿rst di⁄erencing the equation and require that all instruments,
except for the macroeconomic variables in Z, be dated t ￿ 2 or earlier. We
assume that Z is strictly exogenous, while other regressors are allowed to
be contemporaneously correlated with risk.
The validity of the above estimation is checked with two diagnostic tests.
AR(1) and AR(2) test for ￿rst and second order residual serial errors. The
lack of second order serial correlation validates the use of the instruments at
t ￿ 2. Next, the Sargan test is used to determine whether over-identifying
instruments are independent of the estimated errors. Non-rejection of the
null hypothesis of independence validates the instruments we use.
In the Table 3, we present the summary statistics of a sample of 35
private banks between 1990 and 2000. The choice of the sample is the
same as examined in Section 2. The table reports the descriptive statistics
17including the mean, the standard deviation, the minimum, the maximum,
the median, and the ￿rst and third quartile values.
The mean and median sizes of our sample banks measured by real estate
loan ratios (Risk) are 5.63% and 3.31%, respectively, suggesting that the
distribution of this variable is skewed to the right. As a matter of fact,
approximately one-fourth of our sampled banks invest in the real estate
sector more than 10% of their risk-adjusted assets. The ratio of subordinated
debt to risk-adjusted assets (Subdebt) also displays a skewed distribution.
The mean and median of the subordinated debt ratio are 1.65% and 1.39%,
respectively.
Table 4 reports the estimation results. Franchise value (fran) does not
seem to be a determinant of risk in the ￿rst equation if we assume a linear
speci￿cation of estimation. In the second equation, however, the coe¢ -
cient of the interaction term between bank capital (cap) and franchise value
(fran) is signi￿cant at the 10% level, suggesting that the risk-capital re-
lationship is indeed nonlinear and depends on the level of franchise value.
From the negative coe¢ cient of bank capital (cap) and the positive coef-
￿cient of the interaction term, the sensitivity of risk with respect to bank
capital is found to be positive when franchise value (Tobin￿ s q) is above
1.90, but becomes negative when franchise value falls below this threshold.
This result supports our hypothesis that franchise value matters in the risk-
capital relationship. The critical value of franchise value lies between the
75th percentile (1.56) and the maximum (3.21), suggesting that many banks
respond to a decline in capital by taking greater risk instead of taking lower
risk.
The coe¢ cients represent that a one standard deviation decline in the
ratio of capital to risk-adjusted assets increases the real estate loan ratio
by 0.11% (absolute change in the percentages, hereafter) for the banks with
franchise values at the median. This e⁄ect is even stronger for banks with
lower franchise values. The banks with franchise values at the 25th percentile
increase their portfolio of real estate assets by 0.15%. In the steady state,
where the lagged risk on the right hand side equals the current risk on the
left hand side, the long-run e⁄ect on risk of a one standard deviation decline
of capital is 0.40% for the banks with franchise values at the median and
0.55% for the banks with franchise values at the 25th percentile. Note that
the overall proportion of real estate loans increased by 2%, from 11% in 1990
to 13% in 1999, as can be seen in Figure 2. The risk-shifting incentives due
to low capital and low franchise values play a signi￿cant role in the portfolio
risk decisions of Japanese banks.
184.2 E⁄ect on Risk of Policy Shocks A⁄ecting Capital
4.2.1 Capital Adequacy Requirements
Next we examine whether capital-constrained banks take more risks than
unconstrained banks (Proposition 2). As discussed in Section 2, we use
the subordinated debt ratio as a proxy for the extent of capital adequacy
regulatory pressure since undercapitalized banks issued more subordinated
debts to meet the requirement.
The equation we estimate is:
riski;t = ￿1 + ￿1riski;t￿1 + ￿2capi;t + ￿3subdebti;t + BZt + "i;t
"i;t = ￿i + ￿i;t;
where subdebt is the ratio of subordinated debt to risk-adjusted assets. We
incorporate the capital-asset ratio (cap) as a control variable, in addition to
macroeconomic variables (Z), because it is a key determinant of bank risk
(risk) and signi￿cantly related to the subordinated debt ratio (subdebt). If
the capital requirement encourages, instead of discourages, risk-taking by
banks, we would expect a positive relation between the subordinated debt
ratio and the risk measure.
The results from the ￿rst regression of Table 5 indicate that the coef-
￿cient of the subordinated debt ratio is positive and signi￿cant at the 5%
level. The coe¢ cient shows that a one standard deviation increase in sub-
ordinated debt represents an increase in the real estate loan ratio of 0.22%
and the long-run e⁄ect is 0.82%. This suggests that when the capital re-
quirement was about to be binding, banks issued more subordinated debt
to meet the requirement and invested more in the real estate sector than
unconstrained banks did.
This perverse e⁄ect of capital requirements is worth noting as this Japanese
experience lies in sharp contrast with the "credit crunch" observed in the
U.S. banking industry. Peek and Rosengren (1994, 1996) explain that banks
in New England in the early 1990s could not recapitalize because issuing
stocks would have incurred substantial agency costs under asymmetric in-
formation. Accordingly, they had no alternative but to reduce their assets,
especially loans to the real estate sector. Conversely, since Japanese banks is-
sued subordinated debts with less di¢ culty, they increased their real estate
loans and took greater risks. Neither a capital requirement as regulatory
pressure nor subordinated debts worked properly to limit the risk-taking
behavior of Japanese banks.
194.2.2 Government Capital Injections
In March 1998 and March 1999, the government injected public funds into
banks in order to help them raise their capital ratios. Among the 35 banks
in our sample, 17 banks applied for capital injections in 1998 and 14 banks
applied in 1999. Because weak banks did not want to draw attention to
themselves by applying for more capital injections, most banks applied for
the same amount (100 billion yen) in 1998. Contrary to the ￿rst injections,
the amount varied by banks and re￿ ected the conditions of individual banks
for the second injections in 1999.
In the second regression of Table 5, we drop the subordinated debt ratio
and replace it with the government capital injections as a share of risk-
adjusted assets (injection) due to their high correlation. The correlation
between the two variables is 0.46 with a p-value of 0.001. This suggests
that government allocated more public funds to weakly capitalized banks
with more subordinated debt issuance. The question we ask here is whether
the capital injections by the government reduce the banks￿holdings of risky
assets (Proposition 3).
The estimated coe¢ cient on capital injections is consistent with what
we would expect, which is negative and signi￿cant at the 5% level. A one
standard deviation increase in capital injections by the government implies
a decrease in the real estate loan ratio by 0.23% and the long-run e⁄ect is
0.84%. It follows from this that government capital injections led banks to
reduce lending to the real estate sector.
Although the di⁄erence in the result from the capital adequacy require-
ment is striking, we need to be cautious in interpreting this regression result
because the capital injections were accompanied by stringent conditions for
the recipient banks from the government (e.g. submission of restructuring
plans). Some commentators argued that the conditionality of the injections
was more e⁄ective than the capital injections themselves in stopping banks￿
risk-taking. However, it is not an easy task to distinguish between the e⁄ect
of capital injections and that of the accompanying conditions. We demon-
strate here that the risk-reducing e⁄ect of capital injections can be explained
by our forward-looking model with franchise values.
5 Conclusion
In this study, we have examined why Japanese banks increased their expo-
sure to the real estate sector during the 1990s despite the downward trend
of land prices. Using the real estate loan ratio as a new proxy for portfolio
20risk of banks, we ￿nd evidence to support the "gambling for resurrection"
hypothesis: banks with low capital-to-asset ratios and low franchise values
choose high-risk assets at the expense of the deposit insurance system. We
also ￿nd that the capital-risk relationship changes from positive to negative
as franchise value falls. Franchise value has signi￿cant bearings on banks￿
risk decisions.
Next we investigate whether a capital adequacy requirement and govern-
ment capital injections were e⁄ective in limiting the risk-taking behavior of
banks. We ￿nd, using the subordinated debt ratio as a proxy for the regula-
tory pressure of a capital requirement, that capital-constrained banks take
greater risks. Since it is less di¢ cult for undercapitalized banks to issue sub-
ordinated debts to meet the capital requirement, they could a⁄ord to lend
more to the real estate sector. In contrast, government capital injections led
banks to decrease risky loans at the margin.
It should be emphasized that neither a capital adequacy requirement as
regulatory pressure nor subordinated debts as market discipline functioned
to reduce banks￿risk-taking. These empirical results have several policy
implications.
Firstly, the capital adequacy requirement should be adjusted to risk lev-
els by sector. Since the current BIS risk-adjusted capital standards put the
same risk-weights on loans, this may lead to the capital requirement being
ine⁄ective.
Secondly, the role of subordinated debt in the context of a capital ade-
quacy requirement has to be reconsidered. Most subordinated debts issued
by banks were purchased by insurance companies and non-￿nancial com-
panies which have intimate relationships with the issuing banks. Both in-
surance companies and non-￿nancial companies are major shareholders of
the banks, while banks are also their major shareholders. Hence, there is
no problem of asymmetric information between issuing banks and buyers of
subordinated debts. This is one of the reasons why subordinated debts did
not play the role of market discipline. The close relationship between banks
and these a¢ liated ￿rms helped the recapitalization of banks and mitigated
the credit crunch. However, it consequently allowed banks to shift their
loan portfolio toward the most risky industry, the real estate sector, and to
eventually accumulate non-performing loans.
Thirdly, the ￿nancial authority should also take responsibility for the
risk-taking behavior of banks. Indeed several measures were taken to avoid
the credit crunch, but the ￿nancial authority did not pay enough attention
to banks￿risk-shifting incentives and the resultant bad loan problem. Reg-
ulatory forbearance of problem banks remains a signi￿cant issue in Japan.
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25Table 1. Proportion of non-performing loans by industry
1999 2000 2001 2002
Real estate 27.11 27.83 30.43 34.98
Construction 6.73 13.18 9.66 11.00
Financial institutions 11.30 8.15 5.92 6.00
Manufacturing 8.34 5.19 8.24 9.12
Services 23.20 22.28 19.30 13.07
Wholesale and retail 13.90 15.75 16.19 16.55
Individual and other industry 9.43 7.61 10.26 9.26
Total (%) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
An average of the proportion of non-performing loans by industry for
4 major city banks is presented. The sample consists of UFJ, Mitsui-
Sumitomo Bank, Mizuho Bank, and Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi during March
1999-March 2002 (end of ￿scal year). Data on non-performing loans are ob-
tained from Tankan reports of individual banks.
26Table 2. Analysis of subordinated debt




equity capital -0.899*** -0.572***
(0.043) (0.034)
hidden capital gains -0.616*** -0.777***
(0.059) (0.040)
provisions for loan losses -0.861*** -0.947***
(0.400) (0.265)
no. of obs. 347 347
no. of groups 35 35
The results of Tobit and Random-Tobit estimates of the determinants of
subordinated debt issuance are presented. The latent variable in the index
function equals the ratio of subordinated debts to total risk-adjusted assets,
if it takes a non-negative value. The independent variables in the function
are bank equity capital, hidden capital gains and provisions for loan losses,
each as a proportion of total risk-adjusted assets at time t￿1. Year dummies
are also included to control for time trends, but their coe¢ cients are not
reported. The sample consists of 35 private banks subject to the 8 percent
BIS capital adequacy requirement as of March 1999. The sample period is
between 1990 and 2000. 302 observations are uncensored, 45 observations
censored. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. Signi￿cance of the
coe¢ cients at the 10%, 5%, 1% level are denoted by *, **, ***, respectively.
27Table 3. Summary statistics
Variables Mean Std.dev. Min. Q1 Median Q3 Max.
Panel A. Bank characteristics
Risk (%) 5.63 5.59 0.25 0.94 3.31 9.45 21.58
Cap (%) 9.80 1.29 6.98 8.96 9.44 10.39 15.40
Subdebt (%) 1.65 1.43 0.00 0.42 1.39 2.63 6.68
Injection (%) 1.62 1.30 0.17 0.42 1.28 2.48 5.13
Fran 1.26 0.49 0.67 0.92 1.18 1.56 3.21
Panel B. Macroeconomic variables
Indpro 113.8 4.8 107.6 109.1 112.7 117.8 124.3
Stock 20.1 4.3 15.4 16.5 19.1 21.4 30.0
Call (%) 3.13 3.01 0.04 0.45 1.75 6.50 8.56
Spread (%) 3.93 1.33 2.33 2.55 4.08 5.17 6.12
Descriptive statistics are presented for a sample of 35 Japanese banks
between 1990 and 2000. Panel A presents measures of bank characteristics:
the real estate loans as a share of total loans outstanding (Risk), the ratio
of capital to risk-adjusted assets (Cap), the ratio of subordinated debt to
risk-adjusted assets (Subdebt), the ratio of the government capital injections
to the risk-adjusted assets (Injection) and the franchise value (Fran), mea-
sured by Tobin￿ s average q (the ratio of total market value to book value
of equity capital). The sample of Injection covers only capital injected
banks. Panel B include the industrial production index (Indpro), Nikkei
225 stock price index (Stock, divided by 1000), the interbank money market
rate (Call) and the spread between the lending and deposit rates (Spread).
Data on bank characteristics are obtained from banks￿￿nancial statements
and Nikkei Financial Quest database. Data on macroeconomic variables are
obtained from Nikkei Financial Quest database.
28Table 4. E⁄ects of capital and franchise value on bank risk
























no. of obs. 382 382
no. of groups 35 35
The results of the dynamic panel model with a GMM estimator are
presented. The dependent variable (risk) is the real estate loans as a share
of total loans outstanding. The independent variables include the ratio of
capital to risk-adjusted assets (cap), the franchise value (fran), measured
by Tobin￿ s average q (the ratio of total market value to book value of equity
capital) and the interaction term between the capital-to-asset ratio and the
franchise value. As control variables, macroeconomic factors common to all
banks￿decisions are also included. They are industrial production index
(indpro), the stock price index (stock), the interbank money market rate
(call) and the spread between the lending and deposit rates (spread). The
sample consists of 35 private banks and the sample period is between 1990
29and 2000. Signi￿cance of the coe¢ cients at the 10%, 5%, 1% level are
denoted by *, **, ***, respectively. AR(1) and AR(2) test the ￿rst and
second order serial correlations of residuals. Lack of serial correlation found
by the AR(2) test validates the use of Yi;t￿2 as an instrument. Sargan tests
whether over-identi￿ng instruments are independent of the estimated errors.
Not rejecting the null hypothesis validates used instruments.
30Table 5. E⁄ects on risk of policy shocks a⁄ecting capital
























no. of obs. 382 382
no. of groups 35 35
The results of the dynamic panel model with a GMM estimator are pre-
sented. The dependent variable (risk) is the real estate loans as a share
of total loans outstanding. The independent variables include the ratio of
capital to risk-adjusted assets (cap), the ratio of subordinated debt to risk-
adjusted assets (subdebt) and the ratio of the government capital injections
to the risk-adjusted assets (injection). As control variables, macroeconomic
factors common to all banks￿decisions are also included. They are indus-
trial production index (indpro), the stock price index (stock), the interbank
money market rate (call) and the spread between the lending and deposit
rates (spread). The sample consists of 35 private banks and the sample
period is between 1990 and 2000. Signi￿cance of the coe¢ cients at the 10%,
315%, 1% level are denoted by *, **, ***, respectively. AR(1) and AR(2)
test the ￿rst and second order serial correlations of residuals. The ￿gures in
brackets are p-values. Lack of serial correlation found by the AR(2) test vali-
dates the use of Yi;t￿2 as an instrument. Sargan tests whether over-identi￿ng
instruments are independent of the estimated errors. Not rejecting the null
hypothesis validates used instruments.
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land price index (urban land prices, left-hand scale)
stock price index (Nikkei 225, right-hand scale)









90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 2000
(%)
provisions for loan losses/ risk weighted assets
subordinated debts / risk weighted assets
hidden capital gains / risk weighted assets
equity capital / risk weighted assets
34